IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
and that the trial court erred in denying its motion to strike certain affidavits that Womersley filed in opposition to the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Estate argues that summary judgment should have been granted in its favor because the designated evidence established as a matter of law that that the services Womersley provided to Prickett were gratuitous. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Court. In particular, it was determined that Prickett was "an incapacitated person in that she
[was] unable to manage in whole or in part her property and [was] unable to provide selfcare." Appellant's App. p. 37. As a result, the probate court ordered the establishment of a guardianship with regard to Prickett's person and property. Thereafter, the Estate moved to strike both affidavits, claiming that they were "inadmissible in that they contain testimony that is: (1) subject to the attorney-client privilege; and (2) conclusory . . . and amounted to improper opinion." Id. at 71, 73.
Following a hearing on June 7, 2007, the trial court denied the Estate's motion to strike the affidavits, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
In the summary judgment order, the trial court determined that the designated evidence supported a conclusion that Prickett requested services from Womersley and that it was Prickett's desire that Womersley would be paid for those services. The trial court also concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the services that Womersley provided to Prickett amounted to necessaries. Finally, the trial court determined that Womersley's claims were not time-barred because the mere fact that the claims were not settled and allowed by the probate court before the guardianship was terminated by Prickett's death should not deprive Womersley from enforcing her claims against the estate. In other words, the trial court found that whatever claim Womersley had against the guardianship would automatically have transferred to the estate "inasmuch as . . . Prickett died before the final account in the guardianship was approved." Id. at 14. At the Estate's request, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction over the appeal on November 5, 2007.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Timeliness
The Estate contends that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted because Womersley's claim for reimbursement and payment for the services she provided to Prickett must be "disallowed as untimely and improperly filed in the probate estate."
Appellant's Br. p. 16. Specifically, the Estate maintains that the probate court's order terminating the guardianship was a final judgment and Womersley's claim must fail because she did not seek to set the judgment aside within one year for illegality, fraud, or mistake or by appealing the order within thirty days of the judgment entry.
In support of its claim, the Estate directs us to Indiana Code section 29-3-10-1, which provides that (b) Upon order of the court, a guardian shall pay from the protected person's property for which the guardian is responsible any claim against the protected person's property, that the court determines has merit. . . . (d) Any person having a claim against the protected person or the protected person's property or against the guardian as such may file the claim with the court at any time before the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and, upon proof of the claim, procure an order for its allowance and payment from the guardianship property.
(Emphasis added).
As set forth above, subsection (b) of the statute does not require a claim for personal services rendered in a non-fiduciary capacity to a protected person to be filed in the guardianship estate rather than in the subsequent probate estate of the deceased protected person. Thus, Womersley's claims are not precluded on this basis. We also observe that Indiana Code section 29-3-10-1(d) does not require a claim to be filed against the guardianship estate in light of the provision that a claim "may" be filed "with the court . . . 
II. Affidavits
The Estate asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to strike Chapleau and Stewart's affidavits that Womersley submitted as part of her designated evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Estate claims that the averments set forth in the affidavits were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the Estate claims that the affidavits were conclusory and contained improper opinions.
In addressing these contentions, we initially observe that the admission of evidence is entrusted to the trial court's discretion. we concluded that the trial court properly excluded the attorney's affidavit based upon the attorney-client privilege. Id. We observed that "the plaintiffs have failed to convince us that discussing, instructing, mentioning, and explaining do not constitute communications." Id.
In this case, the affidavits do not reveal anything that was said by Prickett or Chapleau on the date that the Statement was executed. In other words, there is nothing in the affidavits regarding the content of any prior or subsequent conversations between Chapleau and Prickett. In fact, the only statement that even remotely approaches privileged communication is Chapleau's acknowledgment in the affidavit that he drafted the Statement based upon Prickett's instructions to him. However, this averment does not reveal any communications that cannot be discerned from the Statement itself. In short, Chapleau's acknowledgment merely explains that he was the attorney who drafted the Statement. As a result, the Estate's argument that the affidavits should have been excluded on the grounds that it violated the attorney-client privilege fails.
The Estate further contends that the affidavits should have been stricken "as conclusory App. 1998). The amount of necessary detail lies within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Id. And the Estate has presented no evidence establishing that Prickett was incapacitated to the extent that she could not make a legally significant request.
As discussed above, Prickett expressed her intent in the May 9, 2000, Statement that
Womersley be reimbursed for the services that she provided. Appellant's App. p. 66-69.
Moreover, there was never a finding by the guardianship court that Prickett was mentally incapacitated. Hence, even though a guardianship had been established with regard to Prickett's desire for Womersley to be paid rebuts the presumption that Womersley acted gratuitously. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Estate's motion for summary judgment, and a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the services Womersley provided to Prickett were necessities.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DARDEN, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
